Cavanaugh v. Western Maryland Railway Co., 729 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1984) p311.
Two trains collided with each other. Cavanaugh, an engineer on one of the trains, sued D for $1.5 million for injuries sustained as a result of the crash. D made a counterclaim against P for $1.7 million for property damage resulting from the crash. PREC: DC held that allowing D’s counterclaim would violate the FELA and thus be contrary to the public policy reflected in the Act. RULE: an employer has a right of action against his employee for property damages suffered by him "arising out of ordinary acts of negligence committed with in the scope of his employment" by the offending employee. HOLD: Federal practice compels D to assert this counterclaim now or loose it. If the D is denied this counterclaim it could be denied any right of action to recover ever. This would be unfair. No specific language of the FELA says what P is arguing. Section 5 of the Act (exemption for any device whatsoever) does not exempt a counter claim by the railroad for its own damages. P relies a lot on case of Stack. Are several cases that rule opposite. DISSENT: Congress intended to prohibit counterclaims because the filing of such counterclaims will unfairly coerce or intimidate the injured employee from filing and pursuing his FELA action.
Peterson v. Watt, 666 F.2d 361 (1982) p315.
P purchased land in Arizona on the border which is bound by the Colorado River. The river moved eastward, swallowing some of P’s land. P then made a claim to the land that emerged on the other side of the river in Nevada, believing he was entitled to it. HELD: trial court said P did not own any of the land in Nevada and then went on to decide the rights of Nevada and the US (see book for specific judgment). Nevada and US made a motion to set this portion of the judgment aside on the ground that there had been no "case or controversy" between them. District court denied the motion. US appealed. During appeal Nevada changed its position to argue that the award was proper. Court of Appeals reversed because Nevada never asserted any cross-claim against the US as it could have done under FRCP 13(g). There was a lack of a "clash of adverse parties" and no conflicting interests. Motion to set portion of judgment aside is granted because Nevada did not make its cross claim prior to the judgment. NOTE: I guess this means that Nevada will have to bring its claim back in a new trial???
Barab v. Menford, 98 F.R.D. 455 (E.D. Pa. 1983) p316.
Barab sued Menford (operated an inn – P slipped on a doormat at the inn). Menford brought a third party action against Channel Home Centers, Inc. Because they were the ones who sold the doormat to Menford. Menford denied that it had sold the doormat to Menford and sought to implead Joy Plastics as the true supplier of the doormat. The court denies leave for Channel to implead joy. HOLD: Not proper under rule 14(a) for Channel to implead Joy. A proposed third party plaintiff (Channel) must allege facts sufficient to establish the derivative or secondary liability of the third party defendant. A third party complaint is appropriate only in cases where the proposed third-party defendant would be secondarily liable to the original defendant in the event the latter is held liable to the plaintiff. (In this case the proposed third party defendant would not be liable to the original defendant – original defendant is trying to say it was someone else, and that original defendant is not liable at all.) The fact that Joy may be liable to the original defendant does not form a basis for Channel to implead Joy. The original defendant may have a claim against Joy, but this is not to be determined in these proceedings.