Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985) p399.

intentional homicide

• D was in prison
• he was taken to the dentist and while there he managed to escape from the guard and seize the guards pistol
• taking the dentist's assistant with him as hostage he left the building and tried to find a car in which to escape in
• he went to one house and when the man answered the door and saw D there with the gun, the man slammed the door shut
• D's gun went off, the bullet going through the door, killing the man. A second shot also immediately went off which traveled upward through the door and into the ceiling of the residence
• D claims the shots were accidental resulting from the noise of the door slamming shut - therefore he lacked intent
• during this escape D encountered other people, none of which were injured

Trial judge instructed the jury that "a person shall not be found guilty… if it appears there was no criminal scheme or undertaking or intention or criminal negligence. A person with sound mind is presumed to intend the consequences of his acts." The jury returned a guilty verdict.

Could a reasonable juror have understood the charge as a mandatory presumption that shifted to the defendant the burden of persuasions on the element of intent once the State had proved the predicate acts? Can a jury instruction imply that a defendant must disprove intent to kill?

A jury instruction may not imply that a defendant must disprove intent to kill.

The charge to the jury was prejudicial, as it is the prosecution's job to prove intent; not the D's job to disprove intent.

It is the prosecutions job to prove intent, which is an essential element of murder. To have the D disprove intent is like saying one is "guilty until proven innocent."

dissent: when taken as a whole the jury instruction were clear that in order to convict, there must be evidence of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.