Facts: Mother ingested a controlled substance (cocaine) prior to giving birth. It is thought that she may have transferred cocaine to her children through the blood flow in the umbilical cord. She is charged with doing this twice. Once in 1987 when she had a son, and again when she had a daughter in 1988. There is a Florida Statute which prohibits the delivery of drugs to others.

Issue: Does the Florida Statute permit criminal prosecution of a mother who ingested the controlled substance prior to giving birth for delivery of the substance to the infant during the thirty to ninety seconds following the infant’s birth, but before the umbilical cord is severed?

Rule: Passing of traces drugs in the blood stream between mother and child while connected by the umbilical cord does not constitute delivery.

Holding: The Legislature never intended for the statute to be interpreted to mean delivery between a newborn and the mother. If this is what the legislature so intended the statute should be rewritten.

Rationale: There is no medical testimony adequate to support the trial court’s finding that a "delivery" occurred during the birthing process. There was no "person" to "person" delivery. Legislature never intended for the statute to apply in this way. Mother did not intentionally time her use of cocaine to coincide with the birth. Prosecuting women for this is the least effective response to this crisis.