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| 2 Cal. 3d 285, *; 466 P.2d 996, **;
1970 Cal. LEXIS 272, ***; 85 Cal. Rptr. 444
|
WARNER CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CITY OF LOS
ANGELES, Defendant and Appellant
L. A. No. 29653
Supreme Court of California
2 Cal. 3d 285;
466 P.2d 996;
1970 Cal. LEXIS 272;
85 Cal. Rptr. 444
March 31, 1970
PRIOR HISTORY:
[***1]
Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Frank J. Mackin, Judge.
DISPOSITION: To the extent that it awards damages in excess of $ 81,743.55, the judgment is
reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings in accord with the
views herein expressed; in all other respects the judgment is affirmed. The
parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.
CORE TERMS:
mud, rotary, hole, sand, change order, cause of action, negotiation, log,
disclaimer, drilling, binder, contractor, fraudulent concealment,
misrepresentation, admissible, minute, test-hole, clay, soil, warranty, site,
casing, steel, correspondence, specifications, engineer, casting, depth, feet,
speculative
COUNSEL: Roger Arnebergh, City Attorney, Bourke Jones and Charles W. Sullivan,
Assistant City Attorneys, and Robert A. Clinco, Deputy City Attorney, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Caryl Warner for Plaintiff and Respondent.
JUDGES: In Bank. Opinion by Tobriner, Acting C. J., expressing the unanimous view of
the court. McComb, J., Peters, J., Mosk, J., Sullivan, J., and Coughlin, J., *
concurred.
* Assigned by the Chairman of the Judicial Council.
OPINIONBY: TOBRINER
OPINION:
[*289]
[**998]
Plaintiff Warner Construction Corporation brings suit against the City of Los
Angeles for breach of warranty and fraudulent concealment in connection with a
contract for construction of a retaining wall on Vista Del Mar, a street in the
City of Los Angeles. A jury returned a verdict for plaintiff for $ 150,000.
We hold that, since the interpretation
[***2] of the crucial provisions turned on the credibility of expert testimony, the
court did not err in submitting the constructon of the contract to the jury.
We have also concluded that the evidence supports the jury's finding of
liability. Although certain letters of the city's Board of Public Works, which
contained statements tendered in negotiations for a compromise, should not have
been admitted, their introduction did not cause prejudicial error. Plaintiff's
proven damages, however, reach at most $ 81,743.55; its failure to present
evidence of lost profits renders damages
over that sum speculative. The cause, therefore, must be reversed for a new
trial on the issue of damages.
Vista Del Mar, a street in the City of Los Angeles, runs parallel to the
waterfront along the crest of a hill. The hill is composed of sand and
sandstone of varying but low cohesiveness. In 1964 the city requested bids for
construction of a retaining wall, referred to as a sidehill bridge, to retard
erosion which was undermining Vista Del Mar. In support of the retaining wall,
there would be 29 soldier beams, reinforced concrete pillars of 24 to 30 inches
in diameter and 18 to 34 feet in legth. Twenty-nine
[***3] anchor caissons (reinforced concrete pilings) were to be sunk on the other
side of Vista Del Mar, and joined to the soldier beams by 2-inch steel rods
running under the roadway.
[*290] As the
low bidder at $ 81,000, plaintiff obtained the award of the contract. The
contract provided for amendment by
"change orders" issued by the city at the contractor's request. Five change orders were
issued, increasing the contract price to $ 83,416.53.
During construction, caving occurred in unsupported holes. Plaintiff attempted
to drive steel casings into the sand to support the walls of the holes, but due
to the instability of the sand the jarring threatened the collapse of the
entire work area. Plaintiff then requested a change order to permit drilling
with rotary mud, n1 and a concomitant increase in price. The city refused,
maintaining that the plans required only that holes be drilled, leaving the
drilling method to the contractor's discretion, and thus that no change order
was needed. After extended but unsuccessful negotiations, plaintiff resumed
construction using rotary mud without a change order, and
completed the project.
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n1 Rotary mud is a drilling fluid. Added to the hole during drilling, it coats
the sides of the hole and through hydraulic pressure aids in supporting the
walls and preventing cave-ins. A steel casing can then be added for further
support; after the use of rotary mud the casing need not be driven into the
sand but drops of its own weight.
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[***4]
Plaintiff's suit asserts four causes of action. The first is for the balance
of $ 4,725 plus interest due on the contract; defendant admits this debt. The
second cause of action claims damages of $ 2,716.39 for a five-day delay in
construction pending a change order increasing the depth of the wall by 4 feet.
This cause of action does not relate in any way to the issues of warranty and
concealment, and defendant's briefs on
appeal do not discuss it.
This appeal deals solely with plaintiff's third and fourth causes of action,
which allege respectively breach of contract and fraudulent concealment of
material facts; plaintiff claims damages for the increased cost of construction
resulting from the use of rotary mud, for loss of profits, for loss of
business, and for loss of an advantageous competitive position in the industry.
Plaintiff bases its third cause of action on Standard Specification No. 158,
paragraph 2-8, which provides that if the contractor
[**999]
encounters subsurface conditions materially different from those shown on the
plans, which it could not reasonably be expected to ascertain in advance, a
change order will issue to provide for any increase
[***5] in cost resulting from the unexpected conditions. Plaintiff contends that the
plans impliedly excluded use of rotary mud, leading it to believe soil
conditions permitted casting without rotary mud; it
claims a contractual right to a change order compensating for the increased
cost of using rotary mud.
Plaintiff's fourth cause of action, for fraudulent concealment, asserts
[*291] that the city did not disclose that cave-ins occurred in both test holes
drilled by the city, forcing the city to change its drilling methods and to
abandon the holes before reaching the planned depth of 50 feet. Plaintiff also
claims that the city concealed information that two ancient landslides occurred
at the construction site.
1.
The issue of liability
We consider the issue of liability in three parts: (a) the logs of the test
holes; (b) General Notes 7 and 8; and (c) the nondisclosures.
(a)
The logs of the test holes
The plans and specifications included the logs of two test holes. The logs
show that the city drilled two test holes on the site, which passed through
various layers of sand. Undisputed evidence, however, demonstrated that the
log of test hole No. 1 erroneously reported
[***6] the soil to a depth of 14 feet as
"coarse sand with clay binder" although the material actually discovered was
"coarse sand with minute binder." Likewise, the log of test hole No. 2 listed 26 to 35 feet as
"sand with clay binder" although the material actually encountered at that depth was
"sand with minute binder." Mr. Maurseth, a soil mechanics engineer, testified that
"clay binder" meant, in the trade, a sufficient amount of clay to cause the sand particles
to adhere cohesively;
"minute binder" meant the binding material is present in such minute quantities that it is
inadequate to stabilize the sand. Being less cohesive,
"sand with minute binder" is much more likely to cave in.
We do not accept defendant's contention that the trial
court erred in submitting the interpretation of the logs to the jury. Although
defendant urges that under
Parsons v. Bristol Development Co. (1965) 62 Cal.2d 861, 865 [44 Cal.Rptr. 767, 402 P.2d 839],
"it is . . . a judicial function to interpret a written instrument unless the
interpretation turns upon the credibility of extrinsic evidence," the interpretation of the contract here depends on the credibility of Mr.
Maurseth's testimony that
[***7]
"sand with clay binder" implies not a
"minute" amount of clay, but an amount sufficient to give significant stability to the
formation. The trial court properly relegated that question of credibility for
decision by the jury. (See
Pierpont Inn, Inc. v. State of California (1969) 70 Cal.2d 282, 294 [74 Cal.Rptr. 521, 449 P.2d 737].)
Attached to the test-hole logs was a caveat:
"The test-hole information on these plans shows conditions found only at the
date and location indicated. Bidders are cautioned that the city in no way
warrants that such information is representative of conditions at any other
location,
[*292] or at any other time. Groundwater levels, particularly, are subject to change."
Although defendant contends that this note effectively disclaims any warranty,
we find, on closer examination, that the warranty and the disclaimer pass each
other without collision. The warranty describes the subsurface conditions at
the test holes, but says nothing about conditions elsewhere on the site. The
disclaimer states that
"the test-hole information . . . shows conditions found only at the date and
location indicated," and cautions bidders that the city does
[***8] not warrant that the data is representative
[**1000]
of other locations, but it in no way disclaims the accuracy of the test-hole
logs. n2 Reading the two together, we conclude that the bidder
takes the risk in making deductions from accurate test data, but the city
retains responsibility for any inaccuracy in the data. (See
Wunderlich v. State of California (1967) 65 Cal.2d 777, 784-785 [56 Cal.Rptr. 473, 423 P.2d 545];
Chris Nelsen & Son, Inc. v. City of Monroe (1953) 337 Mich. 438, 446 [60 N.W.2d 182].)
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n2 Standard Specification No. 158, section 2-1, contains another disclaimer,
which is not discussed by the parties on appeal. This disclaimer reads:
"While it is believed that information obtained by the Engineer will be
reasonably correct, the City does not warrant either the completeness or the
accuracy of such information. It is the responsibility of the Contractor to
ascertain the existence of such additional conditions affecting his cost of
doing the work as may be disclosed by
a reasonable examination of the site."
In
E. H. Morrill Co. v. State of California (1967) 65 Cal.2d 787 [56 Cal.Rptr. 479, 423 P.2d 551], we held that the trial court erred in construing a very similar provision to
be an effective disclaimer of specific representations of site conditions. We
there noted the specific character of the representations of site conditions
and of geological conditions; we emphasized the absence of any cross-reference
from the representations to the general language of the disclaimer. We then
quoted from
Hollerbach v. United States (1914) 233 U.S. 165, 172 [58 L.Ed. 898, 901, 34 S.Ct. 553]:
"It 'would be going quite too far to interpret the general language of the other
[sections of the contract] as requiring independent investigation of facts
which the specifications furnished by the government as a basis of the contract
left in no doubt. . . . In its
positive assertion of the nature of this much of the work [the government] made
a representation upon which the claimants had a right to rely without an
investigation to prove its falsity.'" (P. 792.)
The trial court in the instant case read the section 158 disclaimer to the
jury, but instructed them that
"if a public agency makes a positive and material representation as to a
condition presumably within the knowledge of the agency and upon which the
plaintiff had a right to rely, the agency is deemed to have warranted such
facts despite a general provision requiring an on-site inspection by the
contractor." In submitting the issue of the effect of the section 158 disclaimer to the
jury, and its instructions to the jury, the trial court complied with our
decision in
Morrill, and the verdict must be taken as resolving that issue against defendant.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
[***9]
Whether the misrepresentation of
"clay binder" for
"minute binder" was a material misrepresentation, whether plaintiff relied on it, and whether
that
reliance was reasonable, all present disputed questions
[*293] of fact properly submitted to the jury. The jury's verdict impliedly resolved
these issues in plaintiff's favor.
(b)
General Notes 7 and 8
The plans and specifications contained 16
"General Notes." Note 7 provides that
"holes for the soldier beams and anchor caissons shall be made by boring and/or
drilling." Note 8 states:
"soldier beams and anchor caissons shall be cast in place within unsupported
holes, except that where, in the opinion of the engineer, the holes are subject
to caving or sloughing, or are in any way unstable, the walls shall be
temporarily supported by steel casings or shells. Before placing the steel
casing or shells as much of the loose soil as is practical shall be removed
from the holes."
Defendant contends that the language of Notes 7 and 8 does not prohibit the use
of rotary mud, but leaves the
drilling technique entirely to the contractor's discretion. The rotary mud
technique, however, is an unusual and expensive method of drilling,
[***10] and results in castings of less strength than casting against virgin soil. n3
Plaintiff adduced
[**1001]
substantial expert testimony, including not only plaintiff's experts but also
Mr. Reader, the city's engineer in charge of designing the sidehill bridge, to
the effect that the specifications of General Note 8 impliedly excluded the use
of rotary mud and that a change order would be required to permit rotary mud
drilling.
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n3 General Note 8 contemplated casting the concrete against virgin soil; steel
casings, if utilized, were only to furnish
"temporary" support and to be withdrawn before casting. If rotary mud were used, it would
coat the sides of the hole and the concrete would be cast against a thin layer
of rotary mud. The resulting structure has somewhat less strength
since slight lateral movement is possible before the concrete meets the
resistance of the soil.
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In
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. G. W. Thomas Drayage etc. Co. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 33, 37 [69 Cal.Rptr. 561, 442 P.2d 641],
[***11] we held that the
"test of admissibility of extrinsic evidence to explain the meaning of a written
instrument is not whether it appears to the court to be plain and unambiguous
on its face, but whether the offered evidence is relevant to prove a meaning to
which the language of the instrument is reasonably susceptible." Under that test plaintiff's evidence that General Notes 7 and 8 excluded use
of rotary mud was properly admitted, and the interpretation of the General
Notes in the light of that evidence posed a question for the jury.
(c)
The non-disclosure: the alleged fraudulent concealment
A fraudulent concealment often
composes the basis for an action in tort, but tort actions for
misrepresentation against public agencies are barred
[*294] by Government Code section 818.8. n4 Plaintiff retains, however, a cause of
action in contract.
"It is the general rule that by failing to impart its knowledge of difficulties
to be encountered in a project, the owner will be liable for misrepresentation
if the contractor is unable to perform according to the contract provisions." (City of Salinas v. Souza & McCue Construction Co. (1967) 66 Cal.2d 217, 222 [57 Cal.Rptr. 337,
[***12] 424 P.2d 921] (disapproved on other grounds in
Helfend v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 1, 14 [84 Cal.Rptr. 173, 465 P.2d 61]).) As explained in
Souza & McCue Construction Co. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 508, 510-511 [20 Cal.Rptr. 634, 370 P.2d 338]:
"This rule is mainly based on the theory that the furnishing of misleading plans
and specifications by the public body constitutes a breach of an implied
warranty of their correctness. The fact that a breach is fraudulent does not
make the rule inapplicable." (See also
E. H. Morrill Co. v. State of California, supra, 65 Cal.2d 787, 793-794;
John McShain, Inc. v. United States (Ct. Cl. 1969) 412 F.2d 1281.)
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n4 Section 818.8 states that
"[a] public entity is not liable for an injury caused by misrepresentation by an
employee of the public entity, whether or not such misrepresentation be
negligent or intentional." Section 814 provides that nothing
in the Tort Claims Act
"affects liability based on contract." Interpreting these provisions, we held in
E. H. Morrill Co. v. State of California, supra, 65 Cal.2d 787, 793-794, that section 818.8 barred a tort action for deceit against a public entity,
but did not affect an action in contract for breach of warranty.
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[***13]
In transactions which do not involve fiduciary or confidential relations, a
cause of action for non-disclosure of material facts may arise in at least
three instances: (1) the defendant makes representations but does not disclose
facts which materially qualify the facts disclosed, or which render his
disclosure likely to mislead, n5 (2) the facts are known or accessible only to
defendant, and defendant knows they are not known to or reasonably discoverable
by the
plaintiff; n6 (3) the defendant actively conceals discovery from the plaintiff.
n7
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n5 Civil Code section 1710, subdivision 3;
Rogers v. Warden (1942) 20 Cal.2d 286, 289 [125 P.2d 7];
McCue v. Bruce Enterprises, Inc. (1964) 228 Cal.App.2d 21, 27 [39 Cal.Rptr. 125];
Gillespie v. Ormsby (1959) 126 Cal.App.2d 513, 527 [272 P.2d 949].
n6
Lingsch v. Savage (1963) 213 Cal.App.2d 729, 735 [29 Cal.Rptr. 201, 8 A.L.R.3d 537];
Sime v. Malouf (1949) 95 Cal.App.2d 82, 100 [212 P.2d 946, 213 P.2d 788].
Barder v. McClung (1949) 93 Cal.App.2d 692, 697 [209 P.2d 808].
n7
Herzog v. Capital Co. (1945) 27 Cal.2d 349, 353 [164 P.2d 8];
Sime v. Malouf, supra, 95 Cal.App.2d 82, 99;
Williams v. Graham (1948) 83 Cal.App.2d 649, 652 [189 P.2d 324].
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[***14]
[**1002]
All these instances are present in this case, or so the jury could find. The
nondisclosure of the cave-ins and special drilling techniques used in drilling
the test holes transformed the logs into misleading half-truths.
[*295] The facts concealed were exclusively available to defendant. Finally,
plaintiff presented evidence of intentional concealment by the city. n8
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n8 The general disclaimer in Standard Specification No. 158 does not affect
plaintiff's
action for fraudulent concealment. (City of Salinas v. Souza & McCue Construction Co., supra, 66 Cal.2d 217, 224;
A. Teichert & Son, Inc. v. State of California (1965) 238 Cal.App.2d 736, 755 [48 Cal.Rptr. 225]. The latter case was disapproved on other grounds in
E. H. Morrill Co. v. State of California, supra, 65 Cal.2d at p. 792, but remains viable authority on the point in question.)
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
2.
Completion of Performance
The city argues that, since the contract did not expressly authorize use of
rotary
[***15] mud, plaintiff, in performing in that manner, attempted to force the city to
reform the contract and to subvert the policy requirement of competitive
bidding. It contends that modifications of a contract can only be awarded
through competitive
bidding (Paterson v. Board of Trustees (1958) 157 Cal.App.2d 811 [321 P.2d 825]), and that, absent modification, plaintiff's only remedies lie in either prompt
rescission of the contract or discontinuance of performance and suit for
damages (see
Kenworthy v. State of California (1965) 236 Cal.App.2d 378 [46 Cal.Rptr. 396]).
As the court in
Gogo v. Los Angeles etc. Flood Control Dist. (1941) 45 Cal.App.2d 334, 338 [114 P.2d 65], stated, however,
"[a] party induced by a false representation to enter into a contract may
proceed to perform it and sue for damages for the misrepresentation." Evidence in the instant case showed that plaintiff's abandonment of the
project would have created a serious public hazard. The bank on the
downhill side of the roadway had been cut sheer and solidified by a chemical
process. The chemical solidification, however, effected only a temporary
control; a halt in construction pending
[***16] a suit for rescission or damages, or pending further competitive bids, would
have risked the collapse of the road and the sliding of the structure onto the
street below. Under the circumstances, plaintiff justifiably completed
construction; defendant has not questioned the reasonableness of the methods
used, nor the cost incurred, in the completion.
Defendant stands on somewhat stronger ground when it alleges that, in view of
the situation, plaintiff delayed too long before resuming work. Section 2-8 of
the Standard Specifications, however, contemplates that the contractor will
halt performance pending issuance of a change order, and the reasonableness of
plaintiff's delay and its resulting claim for damages raised questions for the
jury.
[*296] 3.
Admission of Evidence
On February 23 and
24, 1965, plaintiff notified defendant of its unwillingness to continue work
without a change order. On March 8 defendant sent plaintiff a report of the
Board of Public Works stating that
"consideration of alternate methods of constructing the project is not thought
to be necessary," and directing plaintiff to resume work.
On March 19 plaintiff sent another request, which suggested
[***17] that rotary mud be used at an additional cost to the city of $ 12,000. The
president of the Board of Public Works, Mr. Gill, sent plaintiff a letter on
March 25 authorizing use of rotary mud and stating that the city would assume
the additional cost. On March 29 the secretary to the board confirmed this
communication, stating that the city engineer would issue an appropriate change
order. In the meantime, however, plaintiff discovered that the additional work
would cost not $ 12,000 as previously estimated, but $ 34,400, and it so
notified the city. As a result of this
communication the defendant
[**1003]
did not issue the change order at $ 12,000; it rejected plaintiff's $ 34,400
offer.
The trial court, over defendant's objection, admitted into evidence the letter
from Mr. Gill authorizing use of rotary mud and stating that the city would
assume the additional cost, and the letter from the secretary of the board
confirming the president's letter. Plaintiff offered these exhibits generally,
without specifying any basis for their admission. Defendant objected on
several grounds, including Evidence Code section 1152, which provides in part:
"Evidence that a person
[***18] has, in compromise . . . , furnished or offered or promised to furnish money
or any other thing, act, or service to another who has sustained or will
sustain or claims that he has sustained or will sustain loss or damage, as well
as any conduct or statements made in negotiation thereof, is inadmissible to
prove his liability for the loss or damage or any part of it."
We cannot accept plaintiff's contention that the correspondence could properly
have been
admitted to show the contemporaneous and practical construction of the
contract. We recognize, however, that the court could properly have admitted
the evidence for the limited purpose of proving plaintiff's bona fide and good
faith efforts to reach an agreement so that work could be resumed. But the
court imposed no such limitation, and we find no basis to hold that defendant
waived the point. We finally conclude, however, that, despite the error in
admission of the evidence, no prejudice to defendant resulted.
The principle of
"practical construction" applies only to acts performed under the contract before any dispute has
arisen. The
"construction
[*297] given the contract by the acts and conduct of the parties with knowledge
[***19] of its terms,
before any controversy has arisen as to its meaning, is entitled to great weight and will, when reasonable, be adopted and
enforced by the court." (Italics added.) (Woodbine v. Van Horn (1946) 29 Cal.2d 95, 104 [173 P.2d 17].) n9 By
March 8, 1965, the parties had reached a stage of clear disagreement on the
crucial question whether plaintiff was entitled to a change order. Anything
said in negotiations after that date could not be admitted under the rule of
practical construction; it remained subject to exclusion under Evidence Code
section 1152. n10
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n9 Accord:
Whalen v. Ruiz (1953) 40 Cal.2d 294, 301 [253 P.2d 457];
Gillespie v. City of Los Angeles (1950) 36 Cal.2d 553, 561 [225 P.2d 522].
n10 Plaintiff cites
California Home Extension Assn. v. Hilborn (1951) 37 Cal.2d 459, 465 [235 P.2d 369], which stated
"Although the statements were allegedly made during a conference at which the
parties were attempting to compromise their difficulties, that fact does not
justify exclusion of the evidence if it was otherwise admissible." Evidence Code section 1152, however, expressly excludes not only offers of
compromise but also
"any conduct or statements made in negotiation thereof."
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[***20]
Plaintiff argues that since the contract provides for its own modification by
change orders, a dispute should not be said to arise until the parties have
abandoned efforts to resolve the controversy within this contractual framework.
Although the instant agreement does include an amendatory procedure, all
contracts can be amended by consent of the parties; a compromise in a contract
dispute, even if reached at the courthouse steps, will often take the form of a
modification of the contract. We see no valid grounds for distinction between
contracts which contemplate amendment and those which do not. n11 The purpose
of section 1152, to promote candor in settlement negotiation (see Evid. Code,
§
1152, Law Revision Com. com.), applies equally in both instances.
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n11 The only authority we have found which bears even remotely on the point,
Jones,
Evidentiary Concepts in Labor Arbitration: Some Modern Variations on Ancient
Legal Themes (1966) 13 U.C.L.A. L.Rev 1241, 1278-1279, discusses the exclusion in labor
arbitrations of evidence of offers of compromise arising during the contractual
grievance procedure.
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[***21]
[**1004]
We have stated that we believe that the correspondence between the parties
could have been admitted to show that during the delay of March 1965 plaintiff,
in good faith and pursuant to the contractual procedure, had engaged in
negotiations in the reasonable hope that an agreement could be reached and the
work resumed. n12 Admission of proof of negotiations for this narrow purpose
would not be likely to discourage negotiations; on the other hand, the
exclusion of such evidence, after defendant has put in
issue the reasonableness of plaintiff's delay of performance,
[*298] would arbitrarily limit its rebuttal. Plaintiff then argues that
"if evidence is admissible for any purpose, it must be received, even though it
may be highly improper for another purpose" (Inyo Chemical Co. v. City of Los Angeles (1939) 5 Cal.2d 525, 544 [55 P.2d 850]) and that defendant's sole remedy is to seek a limiting instruction (see Evid.
Code,
§ 355). n13 Since defendant requested no such instruction, plaintiff contends
that it waived any error.
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n12 Evidence of the negotiations might also be admissible to rebut defendant's
claim that plaintiff failed to mitigate damages (see
supra, at p. 295); if defendant had raised any issue respecting plaintiff's
exhaustion of contractual remedies the evidence of negotiations would clearly
be admissible to prove exhaustion.
[***22]
n13 See
Daggett v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. (1957) 48 Cal.2d 655, 665 [313 P.2d 557] (purpose of evidence not specified; objection, for lack of materiality, may
have been based on wrong grounds);
Hatfield v. Levy Brothers (1941) 18 Cal.2d 798, 809-810 [117 P.2d 841] (evidence offered generally; motion to strike based on incorrect grounds);
Brown v. Affonso (1959) 185 Cal.App.2d 235, 239 [8 Cal.Rptr. 156] (evidence offered for proper purpose).
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
In the instant situation, however, defendant's opportunity to seek a limiting
instruction did not constitute a sufficient remedy. (See
Adkins v. Brett (1920) 184 Cal. 252, 258-259 [193 P. 251];
Brown v. Affonso (1959) 185 Cal.App.2d 235, 239 [8 Cal.Rptr. 156].) The evidence was offered generally; when defendant objected, plaintiff's
counsel defended the offer primarily on the ground that the correspondence
showed the actions of the parties under the contract. n14 The trial court
admitted the evidence without any hint of limited purpose, and to all
appearances the trial judge had rejected defendant's
[***23] contention that the correspondence constituted negotiations of compromise
under section 1152. Under these circumstances defense counsel cannot be
expected to speculate upon the possibility that the court received the evidence
for some undisclosed and limited purpose other than that suggested by its
proponent, or to prepare instructions based on any such speculation. n15
"A trial becomes
[**1005]
unfair if
[*299] testimony thus accepted may be used in an appellate court as though admitted
for a different purpose, unavowed and unsuspected. . . . Such at all events
is the result when the purpose in reserve is so obscure and
artificial that it would be unlikely to occur to the minds of uninstructed
jurors, and even if it did, would be swallowed up and lost in the one that was
disclosed." (Shepard v. United States (1933) 290 U.S. 96, 103 [78 L.Ed. 196, 201 54 S.Ct. 22].) n16
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n14 Evidence Code section 354 states in part that
"[a] verdict or finding shall not be set aside, nor shall the judgment or
decision based thereon be reversed, by reason of the erroneous exclusion of
evidence unless . . . it appears of record that (a) the substance, purpose, and
relevance of the excluded evidence was made known to the court . . . ." Thus when evidence is offered on an inadmissible basis, its exclusion is not
reversible error. (Witkin, Cal. Evidence (2d ed. 1966) p. 280.) The court may,
of course, admit the evidence despite the mistaken theory of its proponent, but
in such event fairness may
require that the court disclose the limited purpose for which it is admitting
the evidence. (Shepard v. United States (1933) 290 U.S. 96, 102-103 [78 L.Ed. 196, 200-201, 54 S.Ct. 22].)
[***24]
n15