Commerce clause

Defendant was convicted in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, H.F. Garcia, J., of possessing firearm in school zone in violation of Gun-Free School Zones Act, and he appealed.

The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Garwood, Circuit Judge, 2 F.3d 1342, reversed and remanded with directions, and government petitioned for certiorari review.

Whether the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 is Unconstitutional.

Whether the Act is regulation of an activity that substantially affects interstate commerce.

Test for determining whether activity is within Congress' power to regulate under commerce clause is whether it substantially affects interstate commerce

After granting certiorari, 114 S.Ct. 1536, the United States Supreme Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist, held that Gun-Free School Zones Act, making it federal offense for any individual knowingly to possess firearm at place that individual knows or has reasonable cause to believe is school zone, exceeded Congress' commerce clause authority, since possession of gun in local school zone was not economic activity that substantially affected interstate commerce.

Affirmed.

Gun-Free School Zones Act, which makes it federal offense for any individual knowingly to possess firearm in place that individual believes or has reasonable cause to believe is school zone, exceeded Congress' commerce clause authority; Act was criminal statute that by its terms had nothing to do with "commerce" or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly defined; possession of gun in local school zone was not economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, substantially affect any sort of interstate commerce; and statute contained no jurisdictional element to ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that possession of firearm had any concrete tie to interstate commerce.

Renquist wrote majority opinion.

Justice Kennedy filed concurring opinion in which Justice O'Connor joined.

Justice Thomas filed concurring opinion.

Justices Stevens and Souter filed dissenting opinions.

Justice Breyer filed dissenting opinion, in which Justices Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg joined.

Rehnquest

- test is to see if there is a "substantial relationship" between Act and Commerce Clause

Kennedy concurring opinion:

• restraint of courts
• federalism
• progression of Commerce Clause decisions not coherent or consistent
• his test is a balancing test

Thomas concurring opinion

• says the power of the Commerce Clause has been extended way to far
• enumerated powers are supposed to be limited
• wants to interpret the Commerce Clause and the Constitution literally

Breyer dissent

• substantial effects and rational basis test
• need to determine whether Congress had a rational basis for believing the Act had a substantial effect on interstate commerce

Souter dissent

• thinks it best to be cautious and defer
• we defer to what is often a merely implicit congressional judgment that its regulation addresses a subject substantially affecting interstate commerce if there is any rational basis for such a finding
• defer - a paradigm of judicial restraint

Stevens dissent

• regulating guns affect all three elements of Rehnquist test
• affects channels, are articles of commerce and articles that can be used to restrain commerce
• it is not 1789 now
• rejects Thomas' ideas